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The logic of contract and the movement to conquer nature have resulted in the triumph of
autonomy and demise of the family. The first of a two-part series.
Family decline appears to be inevitable when viewed with a long perspective. The family has
been progressively differentiated from institutions that now accomplish what was formerly
within the provenance of the family. The city’s gods, and eventually the Church, replaced
ancestral gods. The marketplace, and eventually the modern economy, replaced the family as the
unit of economic production. The city replaced primitive patriarchy. Slowly, and more
controversially, the state has come to fulfill increasing portions of the family’s educational
mission. Even the family’s “provision of social services” has come, more and more, to be a state
concern. This “loss of functions” is a rational application of the division of labor, as functions
extraneous to family life devolve in the presence of institutions better suited to accomplish these
goals. As the family loses more and more functions, its purposes become thinner but, it is hoped,
truer to the reality of what a family is.
This stripping of functions is also, however, cause for serious worry, for the functions of the
family can almost always be exported to other institutions or arrangements or the need for them
can seem to disappear from human life altogether. We must know what constitutes the family’s
end or purpose lest we face the ultimate in family decline.
The “loss of function,” afoot, in some sense, since pre-classical times, has accelerated due to two
powerful intellectual movements. First, the idea of marriage as a contract, derived from
modernity’s overriding concern with personal liberty, has successively thinned the family to the
point that marriage and family life are, from the standpoint of public philosophy, seriously
under-employed. Early liberal thinkers, such as John Locke, thought the chief end of marriage
was the procreation and education of children. For Locke, the heterosexual, conjugal family best
prepares children for self-government in a free society (and much social science data still
confirm Locke’s argument). Since this is the case, Locke held that the public could supervise and
encourage what came to be called the bourgeois family form and require that parents stay
together until their children reach the age of maturity.
As successive theorists called into question whether Locke had accurately apprehended the
function of marriage, they also called into question its form. Liberal and radical theorists, such
as John Stuart Mill and some of today’s feminist thinkers, suggested that marriage could take on
whatever function the marital partners choose. It is with the family in mind that Mill
recommends “different experiments of living” and counsels that “different persons . . . require
different conditions for their spiritual development.” The failure to impute a function to
marriage meant that the public would have to open up the question of form, requiring public
approval of either different or more diverse forms, or, perhaps, no form at all. Even those
defending marriage and family life in the modern world, such as French sociologist Emile
Durkheim, writing around 1900, thought that the family was too emotionally intense and that
parents were too partisan on behalf of their children to be entrusted with the moral education of

the young. Durkheim ended up defending the two-parent heterosexual family as the most
effective means of taming the man's sexual passion and directing his otherwise socially
disruptive desire for the infinite.
Mill’s advocacy on behalf of the private definition of contract, combined with Durkheim’s
willingness to export the family’s educative function to the state, seriously undermined any case
for the public supervision of the marriage contract, and it prepared the ground for an
acceleration of the exportation of functions from the family. Durkheim and Mill both focused the
attention of family on the married adults, tending to strip functions related to the upbringing of
children from the family’s domain. The only remnant of state recognition—in the name of
cultivating self-control among males—was a thin reed on which to defend family life, especially
in the face of Freudian theory (which called into question the goodness of self-control) and
feminism (which questioned whether marriage was good for woman).
Today’s theorists impute to marriage squishy, individualistic functions—such things as
achieving personal fulfillment or sharing access to social services—in order to show that any
form will do, so long as individuals consent to it. Originally, the public helped shape family form
by aligning it with the procreative and educative function, but over time intellectuals thought
that these functions were better conducted elsewhere or that these functions were really tools of
oppression, and thus these same intellectuals accepted many forms of marriage and family life.
This move from the public definition of the contract to the private definition of contract seems to
be the natural outgrowth of the individualistic principles that justified the original idea of
marriage as a contract.
The family’s loss of functions is connected to a second, deeper intellectual trend in modernity:
the movement to conquer nature. The household arises due to the natural and inescapable facts
of life—the utter dependence of children on parental support and the need for a mother to
support and receive protection from a father. Yet human beings are not enslaved to their
biology: the borders of what constitutes a natural imperative have changed as human beings
have sought to increase their empire over nature, and have invented new modes to deal with the
natural imperatives of age and sex difference. Seeking to show that these two imperatives are not
as imperial as people first thought, modern thinkers re-design the household in different ways.
This effort begins, again, with Locke, who exhorts people to free themselves from the
imperatives to which nature seems to have consigned human relations. Among the “almost
natural” institutions that Locke would have human beings shed is patriarchal government and
pain in childbirth. Subsequent thinkers, particularly Mill, emphasize the social construction of
gender, seeing natural sex differences as tools invented to keep women in a state of slavery.
Later waves of feminist thinkers worked out his logic, showing that fathers and mothers were
positively harmful in their effects on children or, at least, were replaceable by other institutions,
especially the state as a provider of care. The effort to see sex differences as artificial led to the
need to reinvent institutions to handle the difficulties of age difference.
These profound intellectual trends have affected how men and women view themselves and view
children and childbearing. The logic of contract has culminated in a triumph of autonomy. The
movement to conquer nature promotes greater gender equality as an exercise in autonomy.
Institutions buckle things together, suggesting that they have a necessary or salutary relation to
one another, and both these trends reflect the modern penchant for separating what institutions
once united. Marriage and family life had, among other things, buckled love and marriage,
marriage and parenthood, parenthood and sex, marriage and sex, and sex and procreation
together. Every modern defender of some family form ends up defending, in one way or another,

various connections among these goods; the more radical the critics of the family are, the more
buckles they seek to loosen.
Today we face the possibility of the family’s end, in part because of the attractive promise to free
us from the buckles that nature seems to place on our freedom. The erosion of these buckles
explains, in no small part, the amazing decline in birth rates seen across the Western world.
Encapsulating all of these separations in one fell swoop is the move for public recognition for
same-sex marriage, as it is the victory of the adult-centered marriage contract to secure
whatever goods the adults choose, and is the final detachment of marriage and family life from
nature. The question is, then, what is to be done?
Scott Yenor is Associate Professor and Chair of Political Science at Boise State University. This
article is drawn partly from his book Family Politics: The Idea of Marriage in Modern Political
Thought (February 2011).
Receive Public Discourse by email, become a fan of Public Discourse on Facebook, follow
Public Discourse on Twitter, and sign up for the Public Discourse RSS feed.
Copyright 2011 the Witherspoon Institute. All rights reserved.
No Related Posts

